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Italy 
Imitation and resistance: some considerations on comparative and long 
period analysis 
Until a few years ago, there was general agreement that the United States had 
always led in the field of management education, and for these reasons, its 
models have been easily exported to Europe. 
Since the end of the 80's, however, this belief has become questionable. 
American experts have begun to consider business education's deficiencies in 
the Unites States and to compare them with the weakening of American 
management's organizational capabilities. At the same time, they have begun 
to realize that some European business schools, especially those developing a 
transnational focus and teaching international business as a subject integrated 
throughout their curriculum, have achieved a competitive position in the world 
of management education'. This "revisionistic" attitude has stimulated scholars, 
particularly business historians into analyzing business schools' historical 
heterogeneity and different patterns, both in organizational design and training 
strategies. Recently, they have produced a set of case studies in which the 
historical approach has a crucial role in analyzing the different solutions 
proposed by each institution to similar organizational problems. Herbert Simon' 
has stated that these problems are principally related to the functional 
complexity of the business school and in particular the necessity of integrating 
two different social systems and their cultural patterns: the social system of 
practitioners and the social system of scientists in relevant disciplines (such as 
mathematical sciences, behavior sciences, accounting) whose heterogeneity is 
also evident. 
This heterogeneity is more striking if one considers the development of 
commercial and entrepreneurial training over a long period, ie. from the second 
half of the 19th century. It is important to stress that the level of coordination 
and integration between the university system and the industrial economy system 
' Susan A. Aaronson, Serving America's Business? Graduate Business Schools and 
American Business, 1945--1960 in "Business History", No 1 /1992, pp.160-482 
S. Greenhouse, Studying Business? Why stick to just one continent ? "The New 
York Times", Sunday, June 30, 1991 
' Herbert A. Simon, The business schools: u problem in organi=utional design, in 
"Journal of Management Studies", wl.4, No 2, pp.2-12 
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was always the product of a long process of trial and errors which in some cases 
lasted for almost a half of a century. Even though the results of this 
experimental process pointed to qualitative and quantitative differences from one 
country to another, the process in itself was not a distinguishing element of 
peripheral countries such as Italy or Spain; this experimental character applied 
to Germany as well as, to some extent, the United States. Until now, only 
Robert Locke has tried to make a systematic comparison of the relationships 
between higher education and entrepreneurial performances, comparing the three 
main European countries (England, France and Germany) with the United 
States'. His analysis, however, did not succeed in completely avoiding the limits 
of functionalist approach, in particular in relation to his Getman case study, in 
contrast to other European countries which were scarcely interested in 
developing their own management education's strategies and institutions at the 
beginning of the 20th century, only becoming more receptive to the impact of 
the American management after the Second World War. In fact, the dynamics 
of cultural resistance versus imitation of foreign patterns is more complex and 
articulated and less "linear"! In other words, the process of integration and 
refusal is not entirely the product of rational choices, but also the effect of a 
system of micro decisions taken in the long period which are not only related 
to management education but rather to the complex articulation between the 
social system of scientific knowledge and the social system of professional 
practice and to its selective results. 
Locke argued that, since the beginning this century, Germany had 
produced the right educational environment for the right economic and 
entrepreneurial development. However, he did not consider that this effect of 
integration was the result of a long process of empirical trials. Moreover, he did 
not consider that the peculiar patterns of business education in Germany were 
shaped not by the proper adaptation of German technical institutes to the 
demand of the industrial environment, but other factors. These factors were 
internally related to the process of institutionalization in the higher education 
system. At the beginning of the 20th century the theoretical debates concerning 
some crucial and dominant disciplines such as political economy and sociology 
had, in fact, a role in shaping the institutional and theoretical pattern of new 
a Robert R. Locke, The End of the Practical Man: Entrepreneurship and Higher 
Education in Germanv, France and Great Britain (1840--1940) , London, Jay Press, 
1984 and Management and Higher Education since 1940. The influence of America and 
Japan on West Germany, Great Britain and France, Cambridge Univ. Press 1989 
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disciplines. Recent studies-' demonstrate that, not only in Germany but also in 
Italy, the influence of positivism and more specifically the results of the  
"Methodenstreit" at the beginning of this century, stimulated the emergence of 
an unified theory of the firm. This mainly deductive approach was very different 
from the basically inductive "case method" approach, which progressively 
became the dominant pattern of American business education. 
The theory of the firm was a basic ingredient in the genealogy of both 
"economia aziendale" in Italy, at the Bocconi university, and 
"Betriebswirtshafslehre" in Germany. In France, on the contrary, "les sciences 
de gestion" were characterized by a more empirical approach, avoiding any 
attempt to integrate "gestion" (both as a teaching subject and as a training 
pattern) into a general theory of the firm. With Fayol, "la gestion" was 
intellectually rather than theoretically founded: to be more specific, it was a 
"doctrine ,6  with intellectually rooted foundations rather than a theory with an 
applied aim, as was in Germany. Its disciplinary identity remained very fluid 
and was based on juridical disciplines as well as engineering, with the additional 
support of "fart du commandement" which was a subject in military schools as 
well as in the Ecole Polytechnique. Further still, despite similar denotative 
characters, European institutions showed many connotative differences. In most 
European countries, the education of managers only took place at universities, 
defined in a broad sense, hence including polytechnics and schools of 
commerce. But the connotation of these institutions differed greatly from one 
country to another, reflecting the different structural factors mentioned above. 
If one considers, then, the long-term effect of historical change (that is the 
different roles, from one period to another, of interacting factors such as 
professional interests, institutional rivalries, national and international 
competition, financial constraints or opportunities, economic or organizational 
asymmetries), the changing patterns of business education become evident. For 
example, in the United States, business administration was essentially 
engineering plus economics; later on it was centered also on organizational 
behavior. In Germany, it was above all accounting, and only in a second period 
of development, the study of the economics of companies, 
5 A. Canziani and P. Rondo Brovetto, The Economics of the Finn in Continental 
Europe during 1920's. Betriebswirtshaftslehre and Economia Aziendale as 
Methodological Revolutions in "Perspectives ori the History of Economic Thought", vol.  
VIII, edited by S. Todd--Lowry.  
e  H. Fayol, Administration industrielle et générale, (1925), Paris, Dunod, 1979 and 
D. Reild, Genèse du}ayolisrne, in "Sociologie du Travail", IV, 1986.  
~ 
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"Betriebswirtshaftsleln•e". In the Italian "Scuole di conrnrercio", it was mainly  
"ragioneria", and later, with the creation of the "Bocconi", "economia 
aziendale".  Thus, we are confronting an evident asymmetry both in space and 
in time which was rapidly (and to some extent only apparently) reduced during 
a specific historical period from 1950 to 1970 by a homologous process 
produced by the impact of American management education system in Europe. 
This process, however, was part of larger scenario of "cooperation strategies" in 
other sectors considered of crucial importance in reinforcing US political 
leadership in the West such as for example technological cooperation in space. 
This occurred especially during the sixties when the relationship between 
technology and economic growth became a strategic element in US-European 
relationships. This growing interest "was mainly channelled into and 
institutionalized by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)"' which also had an important role in stimulating the 
development of European management education as a strategic crucial factor 
in reducing the asymmetry - "technological gap" - between the two continents. 
I shall return to this point. 
What I would like to stress here is that, a crucial part of analyzing the 
dynamics between national patterns and processes of homologation to a 
dominant system, is to define conceptual tools and also to find strategic topics 
which could improve the comparative approach both in time (in the long period) 
and in space (national and international). 
Important suggestions could be found in recent methodological literature 
on comparative analysis. The method based on the analysis of "contrast of 
contexts" ', for example, seems to be particularly useful in developing the 
generalization of empirical case studies. This approach is oriented to maintain 
their peculiar originality especially when their historical framework is 
considered, rather than to produce a simple inventory of institutional similarities 
and differences. On the contrary, the basic ground for comparison is the 
selection of some general and crucial questions which oriented the comparative 
analysis. The focus in this case is not the study of the distribution and diffusion 
of training patterns in managerial education but the interactive and cultural 
dimension which orients their historical development. The main goal is to 
' On this subject see L. Sebesta, The Politics of Technological Co--operation in 
Space: US--European Negotiations on the Post--Apollo Programme, in "History and 
Technology", 1994, wl.H, pp. 317--341 
'  C. Ragin, Comparatine Sociology and Comparatine Method, in "International 
Journal of  Comparatine Sociology" XXII, 1, pp.102--120  
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develop an analysis which emphasizes the variety of answers to a rather 
homogeneous set of problems such as how to produce the integration of 
professional standards and practices into the business schools' curricula or how 
to adapt them to scientific changes and methodological innovation in the 
relevant disciplines or systems of disciplines. This variety is not only the 
product of institutional strategies but also of inner factors which characterized 
cultural contexts. an anthropologist, Yahuda Elkana, has qualified these factors 
as "images of knowledge", that is socially based conceptions concerning 
knowledge such as sources, legitimization patterns, rules, values, behaviors and 
rituals. In most European countries, management as a cultural pattern (which the 
business schools developed and diffused in cooperation with different institutions 
such as universities, firms, trade associations, private foundations) has 
progressively imposed itself as a dominant pattern which overlapped previous 
images of knowledge and their institutionalization as disciplines, such as  
"economia aziendale" in Italy, "gestion" in France, and "Betriebswirtschafslehre" 
in Germany and in some Northern countries. Despite the relations of 
"familiarity" with American management, these social practices of knowledge 
maintained, even after the dominant impact of the American patterns in Europe, 
a basic heterogeneity not only from the connotative but also from the denotative 
point of view. It is a matter of fact that until the present this heterogeneity was 
in many cases underestimated and only recently scholars, institution builders and 
institutional reform's designers seem to consider the role of inner factors of 
cultural resistance as an important element in shaping new educational strategies 
or institutional reform projects. In this case, reference to the comparative 
approach based on "contrast of contexts" could reveal also an applied aim. 
It is important to stress that this method becomes particularly useful when 
the field of inquiry is characterized by phenomena of "translation" and 
"transmission" of cultural and organizational patterns among contexts which are 
heterogeneous not only in their historical development but also in their 
asymmetrical position within the systemic framework produced by the above 
mentioned dynamic of transmission and transfer of "dominant" cultural and 
organizational patterns. The domination of the American patterns in managerial 
education after World War II has implied, in fact, in the European countries, a 
large range of "reactions" from hybridization to imitation, from resistance to 
refusal, whose historical analysis has become crucial especially in the last years, 
when the asymmetrical map of managerial education in the international context 
entered into a phase of transition, characterized by phenomena of inversion of 
direction in the relationship between European and American patterns and by 
the emergence of pluralism as a strategic target. 
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A strategic topic: cross-fertilization policies 
This article's goal is to develop some of these methodological issues and to 
investigate the historical background in which this inversion was set up 
through the exploration of a transversal subject: the Ford foundation's financial 
and organizational involvement in developing European management education. 
In this context, the Ford foundation acted as a cultural entrepreneur which tried 
to standardize managerial educational patterns and professional requirements 
through a dissemination of intensive training and research programs. They were 
first experimented upon during the early fifties, in the most important American 
business schools. In a second phase, since the mid-sixties the Ford foundation 
acted also as a translator of American patterns into different European 
institutional and cultural frameworks. I shall return to this point giving a more 
detailed analysis using specific case studies. What it is important here is to 
stress the fact that the two phases were not mechanically related as the result of 
a "carbon copy" strategy of transfer. In short, this is not a topic we can easily 
insert in the obsolete chapter of "Americanization". Instead the concept I have 
used to analyze this transfer is that of cross fertilization which implies a 
process of translation from one context to another, rather than a mechanical 
transfer. From this point of view the concept of cross-fertilization is also used 
as a detector to identify some crucial "contrasts of contexts" in the development 
of management education, especially during the period 1954-1974 which is 
precisely the period of largest development of the Ford foundation's involvement 
in European cultural and institutional policies. It should also be stressed that the 
Ford foundation was not the only actor in the cross-fertilization policies 
concerning management education. One should consider also the role of other 
institutional or even individual actors. The origins of the translation of 
American educational patterns is related to the role that the Harvard Business 
School had during the thirties in the diffusion of the "case method" in Europe 
and especially in France. In fact, this process was mainly the product of the 
individual initiative of "a man with a vision", General Georges Frederic Doriot.  
Born a Frenchman, Doriot was educated in the United States and had 
become vice-dean of the Harvard Business School by the age of 28. In 1930, in 
cooperation with a small group of French entrepreneurs he took the initiative of 
creating the CPA (Centre de Préparation aux Affaires) in Paris, this being the 
first European outpost to develop the case method approach, both in teaching 
9 On this subject see S. Schlossman, M. Sedlak, H. Wechsler, The "New Look.": 
The Ford Foundation and the Revolution in Business Education ,GHAC, Occasional 
papers, december,1987 
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and research training10. Doriot had a long career, both in the educational field 
and in capital venture enterprises ( he was the founder of the ARD American 
Research and Development and of its European "agency", the ERD). In the mid-
fifties, he also conceived and pioneered INSEAD which was founded by 
Doriot's former French students in the HBS class of Manufacturing: Olivier 
Giscard d'Estaing, Roger Godino and Claude Janssen. Doriot was also an active 
fund-raiser for INSEAD both from the Ford foundation (he was actually 
influential member of its Board of Trustees) and many important American 
companies (see figure 1). 
The process of cross-fertilization, upon which the "new look" in 
management education was designed by the Ford foundation and then transposed 
to the old continent, was anticipated and bolstered by another factor: the detailed 
and articulated studies of the European countries educational and institutional 
situation led by the European Productivity Agency (EPA) from the beginning 
of the fifties. EPA's detailed reports allowed the Ford foundation to adapt its 
strategies to the highly differentiated European environment. Before analyzing 
some elements of the articulated strategies of this cross-fertilization process I 
would firstly like to spend some time describing the general context in which 
the Ford foundation's involvement in European management education took 
place, and secondly, to give some explanation as to the reasons which oriented 
the selection of the two case-studies presented in this article. In what concerns 
the first point it should be stressed that the Ford foundation's role in Europe was 
not the result of a pure strategy in exporting a national, successful experiment. 
It was part of a grander vision of the "diplomacy of ideas" role in strengthening 
Western civilization cultural and ideological unity, through the development of 
higher education programs in research and training which concerned 
management as well as the social sciences". 
Nonetheless, it should be remembered that the basic elements of the "new 
look" in management education projected by the Ford foundation were related 
to an introduction strategy of the behavioral and social sciences in the business 
"' On the history of CPA see G. Gemelli, Per una storia delle business schools in 
Europa.Le origini dell'INSEAD in "Annuli di storia dell'impresa",vol.IX, 1993, pp.336-
404.  
"On this subject see G. Gemelli, The Ford Foundation and the Development of' 
Social and Political Sciences in Italy (1954--1973) in G.  Genu:lli (ed.) Big Culture. 
Intellectual Cooperation in Large--Scale Cultural and Technical Systems. An Historical 
Approach, Bologna, CLUEB,1994. 
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schools curricula and also to structural goals which stimulated research as a 
relevant factor in the process of management professionalization. 
In any case, the development of programs which aimed at improving and 
standardizing European research was related both in the social sciences field and 
in management to the setting up, since 1954, of an autonomous European 
program inside the "International Affairs Area" of the Ford foundation. Thanks 
to the initiative of one of its most outstanding officers, Shepard Stone, the 
foundation elaborated a "grander vision" of Europe which envisaged three goals: 
the strengthening of the Atlantic Community; the strengthening of democratic 
institutions and the widening of European perspectives not only in the 
Mediterranean countries but also in the Eastern countries. The origins of this 
project should be considered as a part of a very complex scenario in which the 
Cold War, at the end of its aggressive phase, shaped the way in which higher 
learning became a strategic factor in political warfare. As recent studies have 
pointed out, this was also the period in which, thanks to better coordination 
between scientists, entrepreneurs and statesmen and the creation of a set of 
relationships between private experts and public agencies in the United States, 
an important transfer of know-how from military research to "big science" was 
achieved. One should not forget that also in the field explored in this article 
there are crucial examples of this kind of transfer. Georges F. Doriot, who 
during the World War 2 became a general of the American army, handed down 
his experience as head of the Department Research and Development of the 
American army, created in 1946, to his activity as organizer of the first 
experiments of capital venture enterprises during the fifties. It should also be 
stressed that a good number of directors and deans of the first European 
business schools came from a background of army experience. In an 
interview' with Alexander King in Paris (who not only conceived but was also 
a great organizer of scientific strategies within the European Productivity 
Agency), I was told that the idea of implementing productivity came directly by 
the previous experience of operational research, applied to the technical 
problems of war effort. 
In some respects, the Second World War and the Cold War were a 
"godsend" for the development of social science and management. The growth 
of plans for an unified Europe, strongly supported by eminent American 
personalities like general William Donovan and Georges Ball and, in the 
Kennedy period, the growing up of an equal US-European partnership in the 
relationship with the United States facilitated and accelerated the growth of 
American interests in Europe. In the mid-sixties the crucial debate on the 
12  October 24, 1993 
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"managerial gap", emphasized by the publication of Servan-Schreiber widely 
acclaimed book, The American Challenge, gave another strong impetus to this 
dialogue and produced the growth of the visibility of management problems as 
a strategic element in the relationships between US and Europe. Big private 
foundations were at the right place to play a crucial role in this process. Their 
importance was emphasized by two factors: the increasing political supremacy 
of the United States in the international context, and particularly, as mentioned 
above, in Europe, and the increasing role of private foundations in dealing with 
specific problems in US public policy and cultural diplomacy. International 
strategies in education and research were part of this scenario whose dynamics 
in what concerns management education and training could be described through 
the selection of specific case studies. Indeed, the two case studies presented in 
this article (INSEAD in France and IPSOA in Italy) have been selected not only 
because they are particularly relevant to illustrate the dynamic context of US-
European relationships but also because they allow the experimentation of the 
"contrast of contexts" approach. In fact they are both related to the same 
historical period, and precisely to the first experimental phase which anticipated 
the extensive involvement of the foundation in European management 
educational programs. Moreover, these case studies concerns two different 
countries which present, within very different institutional, social and 
entrepreneurial contexts, similar resistance's to American educational and 
training patterns. Finally, they are part of a very asymmetrical story, because 
IPSOA had really a very short institutional life, despite the intensity of its 
experience and the positive and innovative effects produced within the social 
and cultural framework of Italian management. On the contrary, INSEAD is not 
only still alive, but as it is largely known, is one of the best and successful 
international business schools. 
A large part of the history of these two institutions can be retraced 
through the Ford foundation's archive. One might also mention, however, that 
the history of many other European business schools (and not only of those 
financially supported by the Ford foundation) could be retraced through these 
files. The advantages of this kind of documentation lie in that it does not tell us 
precisely how each institution was created or how it grew up, rather its position 
in a larger context, nationally and internationally. From it we have a great deal 
of information about the system of competitive-cooperation in which each 
institution was inserted in the different phases of its life. This makes it possible 
to avoid a danger, typical to these kind of studies, which is to consider the 
history of each institution as a linear history, from birth to death, eventually 
enriched by references to the history of other similar institutions in order to have 
some external elements of comparison. On the contrary, in this case, comparison 
is an internal factor. 
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Let me now return to the origins of the Ford foundation's design for 
management education in order to introduce the two comparative case studies, 
I have selected, into their general context. 
The Ford foundation's "new look" in management 
In 1953, the Ford foundation officer, Milton Katz, invited Thomas Carroll, then 
dean of the School of Business at the University of North Carolina and formerly 
an assistant dean at Harvard Business school, "to spearhead Ford's developing 
interest in business education and more specifically, to outline a proposal for 
strengthening the case method of instruction in business"". 
An advisory committee was created to study a specific program for Ford 
foundation intervention in business education reform. Its advice was that "for 
business education to improve, rather than simply follow established practice, 
the foundation had to subsidize and encourage substantial imaginative research 
in a field in which few conducted any research at all and where much of what 
was undertaken was descriptive, industry-specific, if not company-specific"'4. 
This orientation implied that in the profess ionalization of management, 
research should have a central role. The Ford foundation's strategy was to invest 
in a few "excellent" institutions (Carnegie, Harvard, Columbia, Chicago and 
Stanford) and to start a curricula reform based on the incorporation of the 
behavioral and social sciences inside a traditional set of disciplines, such as 
accounting, mathematics and econometrics. 
At the end of the fifties, despite some critics and tensions between 
different sets of priorities, such as developing centers of excellence or improving 
the diffusion of the "new look" to a large range of institutions, the "new look" 
was definitively on the offensive. The decision to transform this strategy in an 
international program was not the mechanical effect of its success within the 
national context. In fact, it is necessary to stress that the foundation had started 
some European experiments in management education development at the 
beginning of the fifties, that is before launching the "new look" in the American 
institutions. As we will see later when the IPSOA's development will be 
" Schlossman, Sedlak and Wechsler, The "New Look" cit. p. 9 
to  IVI p.14 . See also James E. Howell, The Ford Foundation und the Revolution in 
Business Education ,September 1966, Ford Foundation Archive IFFAI, Report 006353, 
pp. 1-2 
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analyzed, it was not a fortunate experiment. The reasons for the Ford 
foundation's considerable involvement in European educational policies should 
rather be seen in the light of different factors which occurred simultaneously. 
First, there were a number of structural changes to the foundation during the 
second half of the 1950s. In this period, two new programs were created: the 
International Affairs Program (established to carry out the Foundation's 
programs in Europe), and the Economic Development and Administration 
Program (created to support educational institutions concerned with economy). 
These programs found a productive field of interaction in managerial education. 
When the International Affairs Program was terminated in the second half of the 
sixties, it was mainly under the Higher Education and Research Program that 
European management education development found a roof over its head and 
the right organization. The officer in charge of this new program was Marshall 
Robinson, who proved to be a capable director of EDA program from 1964-67. 
It is also important to add that, in 1957, the foundation terminated the 
Behavioral sciences program which began in 1951 and which was considered 
by the trustees as becoming too "intellectual", abstract in contents and over-
formalized in methods 15. At that time, the implementation of the behavioral 
sciences' role in management education was perceived as a path to give more 
applied orientation to these disciplines, whose impact on European social 
sciences was rapidly expanding. 
The Ford foundation's European program was also stimulated by other 
external factors related to the dynamics in the international context at the 
beginning of the sixties. In this period, as mentioned above, there was a 
growing interest in the relationship between technology and economic growth 
and, at the same time, an increasing European anxiety towards the "technological 
gap" which characterized the position of the old continent vis-à-vis the United 
States. Management education was perceived as a crucial factor in reducing this 
gap, especially by some of the brightest members of OECD, like Alexander 
King and Jean-Jacques  Salomon'. At the beginning of the fifties, King had 
been the promoter of European productivity strategies; from the mid-fifties, they 
became the key figures of the scientific policies of the European Productivity 
Agency (EPA), directed in Paris by Roger Grégoire, which had its own national 
organizations in many European countries. The directors of these national 
" On these events see B. Berelson, Oral History Transcript, FFA, pp. 20--28 
16 J.J.Solomon was head of the Division des politiques de la science et de la  
technologie at the OCDE. 
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agencies were often promoters of institutional and organizational initiatives in 
the field of human relations studies and management. 
Padre Agostino Gemelli, a member of the "Comitato Nazionale per la 
Produttività"  (the Italian agency of EPA) was one of the few Italian experts in 
applied industrial psychology with a role in introducing human relations in Italy. 
Ivan Matteo Lombardo, the president of the "Comitato", had an important role 
in creating ISIDA (the second Italian school of management located in Palermo) 
with EPA's support in 1956. Under the direction of  Gabriele Morello, a 
promising economist who had previously been assistant professor at IPSOA, 
ISIDA successfully continued during the sixties to follow in the footsteps of 
IPSOA in Turin, with the Ford foundation financial and organizational support. 
I shall return to this point. 
Is important to stress here that the role of the European Productivity 
Agency in implementing the basically technical set of recipes of productivity 
with a large cultural background was firmly rooted in the European traditions. 
A clear example of the EPA's role is home out by the following quotation from 
a 1956 report by Alexander King: 
"There is a reluctance on the part of Universities in some part of Europe -
King wrote- to accept management as a subject of sufficient intellectual 
content for inclusion alongside the accepted disciplines. This has been 
supported by the tendency since the war /../ to introduce the subject in the 
form of particular techniques, sometimes trivial, apparently unconnected 
with each other and often without consideration of underlying principles. 
At the same time there is recognition of the need for well trained, 
progressive managers in European industry /../. It appears to us that 
accepted American methods of training for management, while developed 
more extensively and successfully than elsewhere, have tended to become 
somewhat traditional. On the other hand, the growing needs and 
complexities of industry are clearly making it necessary to develop 
managers of a new type, while the elaboration of scientific methods and 
the unfolding of the social sciences are offering new and dramatic 
possibilities"". 
This statement contains a clear statement of the strategic and methodological 
orientation which inspired the "new look" of the Ford foundation as a positive 
opportunity for developing European management education. Moreover, it 
should be stressed that among the European experts there was a widely-shared 
" A. King, Studies on Management Organisation in Various European Countries 
EPA,Project No 347, FFA, Reel 0068,Grant No 56--51,section 111, pp. 3 and 6 
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belief that European management ought to be built on a large cultural and cross-
disciplinary base integrating the American patterns with the European trans-
national culture. As Alexander King pointed out, this interdisciplinary orientation 
should be based on the increasing use of quantitative methods and mathematical 
analysis, as for example the games theory, scientific method and operational 
research techniques as well as the implementation of social and behavioral 
sciences research tradition. 
If fact, somewhat paradoxically, one could consider the fact that the first 
experiment in European management education took place in a country like 
Italy, with a university system which was completely unaware of cross-
disciplinary educational strategies and totally opposed to innovative experiments. 
Why did the Ford foundation decide to support an Harvard Business School's 
program and launched itself in the IPSOA's adventure? 
The pioneer stage of the Ford foundation's European program: a case study 
First, it should be recalled that this experiment anticipated the foundation's 
involvement in American business education reform which, as mentioned above, 
started in 1953. Rather than being connected to any clear project in management 
education, the IPSOA experiment should be associated with Shepard Stone's 
commitment to work in Europe which rested on the conviction that there were 
promising opportunities for the Foundation in the modernization and reform of 
education as a factor of impetus not only in strengthening the Euro-Atlantic 
alliance but also in the growth of plans for an unified Europe, as mentioned 
above. The main goal was to extend to Europe the "organizational synthesis" 
patterns, carried out in America through the integration of social sciences and 
practical policies, of academic research and public policies, of experts and state 
administration. In Italy the basis of support for Stone's strategy was limited. In 
Italian Universities and academic institutions there was and still is no idea of 
what a cultural policy could mean. Even the word policy was assimilated to or 
confused with "politics". 
Nonetheless, at the beginning of the program, Stone's strategy found 
particular support in a social and intellectual reform movement "Comunità",  
whose energetic and creative pioneer was the Italian industrialist, Adriano 
Olivetti. It is not surprising then, that the Ford foundation decided to support 
Olivetti's idea of creating a post-graduate school for management studies, to be 
located in Turin. Actually IPSOA, (Istituto post-universitario per to studio  
dell'organizzazione aziendale) was the first European business school (after- the 
creation of CPA in the thirties) which imitated the Harvard Business School's 
methods and teaching strategies. 
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IPSOA's case study is a good empirical example of the difficulties and 
obstacles which can hamper a process of mechanical transfer of a set of 
organizational patterns from one context to another especially when the 
industrial system and the higher education system of the countries involved in 
this process are strongly differentiated as in case of the Italian and American 
systems. 
IPSOA was established in 1952 by FIAT's director, Vittorio Valletta, and  
Adriano  Olivetti himself. After a trip to the United States in which they 
participated in an International Conference organized in New York by the 
National Management Council, Valletta and Olivetti decided to start a new 
educational experiment in Italy based on the pragmatic, action-oriented type of 
education existing in the US. With the financial means provided by both their 
companies and with the weight of their personal support, IPSOA was directed 
by a former Olivetti man, Giovanni Enriques, the son of the mathematician 
Federigo Enriques. IPSOA opened its doors in 1952 and for its first year of 
activity, thanks to the agreement between the Ford foundation and the Harvard 
Business School, was able to rely for almost one year on the highly capable 
teaching, in particular the case method, of the professors Melvin  T. Copeland 
(former Director of Research at HBS) and Charles M. Williams (also from  
HBS). In 1953, the first installment of the Ford foundation grant ($13,000) was 
entirely devoted to the case method training and to the development of research 
in this field. 
Under Enriques' management, the success of the school was very rapid: 
the first academic year boasted an intake of 90 students, enthusiasm and 
democratic cooperation (which is unusual in the Italian university) between the 
faculty, very young assistants, often chosen by  Adriano Olivetti himself (as was 
the case of Pietro Gennaro, Gabriele Morello, Piero Bontadini), and students 
coming from varied educational backgrounds. IPSOA was an island of 
innovation in a feudal empire dominated by the rigid and bureaucratic system 
of the Italian university. The new institute rapidly became well known in 
Europe thanks to the energy of a young organizer, Richard Miller, who had an 
intimate knowledge of the Italian mechanical industry. In France, the Centre de  
Préparation aux Affaires  made regular reference to the IPSOA staff in order to 
organism the first European networks in management training and education 
and, in the second half of the fifties the pioneers of INSEAD consulted the 
founders of the Italian school when they started plans for the new institute of 
Fontainebleau. 
Presenting the new institute in "Fortune" magazine, Miller did not hesitate to 
speak of a "second Italian Renaissance". Miller, however, did not conceal crucial 
problems. The Turin Unione Industriale which decided to support the school, 
was an unreliable partner. It did not represent large corporations (virtually the  
15 
most interested in IPSOA's products) but smaller companies which had no 
interest and certainly few resources to be able to send somebody there. In the 
university network, a kind of undeclared war was being waged against the new 
institute whose innovation and dynamic curricula strongly contrasted with the 
static educational system of Italian universities. 
IPSOA's attempts to make alliances with the traditional university power 
structures were indeed short-lived and superficial.  Gabriele Morello observed 
that a real alliance was never desired. IPSOA was perceived as "an esoteric 
transplant" by the university professors and, on the other side, the institute was 
very proud of its "out-of the system" independence. Also in industrial circles, 
IPSOA's training strategies were considered as too far from Italian companies' 
needs. Miller noted that, 
"In Italy, where the basic insecurity of all job-holders is manifested by 
a high degree of individualism and a real lack of cooperation, the 
graduated of IPSOA face a difficult human relation problem in joining or 
returning to an organization. Frankly, the graduates often need the 
assistance of their superiors in making use of valuable training given 
them. In Italy, more than elsewhere, the good man is the man who often 
finds himself alone and feared"". 
IPSOA progressively developed as a kind of "in vitro" experiment, as a 
beautiful but almost useless green-house flower. Yet it was a crucial experiment 
in cultural innovation. The organizational, educational and even behavioral or 
mental patterns of its management, its cooperative and democratic climate 
contrasted the authoritarian and bureaucratic climate characterizing both 
university and most of the largest Italian firms, particularly FIAT. This climate 
stimulated the businessmen's resistance to giving information about their 
company's affairs which were necessary to collecting Italian cases as teaching 
material, in addition to those imported from Harvard. Professor- Copeland 
commented in his memorandum to the Ford foundation that, 
"Another obstacle is the practice of many Italian firms of keeping two sets 
of books, one for the tax purposes and one for business administration. In 
as much as such a large proportion of Italian firms are family owned or 
closely held, furthermore, published financial statements are available in 
only a few instance19 " 
R. Miller, Summary for "Fortune" (Manuscript) FFA, Reel 0950,Grant No 54149, 
pp. 4--5 
19 Melvin T. Copeland, Memorandum to Deun David, FFA, Reel 09.50, grant No. 
54149, pp.5- 7 
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This was also the reason why many of the American cases in business finance 
had a limited applicability to Italy where publicly held companies were rare. 
Copeland agreed with Miller's diagnosis that the most serious obstacle to 
IPSOA's development was represented by the antagonistic academic quarters. 
This antagonistic attitude was based not only on personal envy and criticism but 
also deeply rooted in the Italian intellectual tradition. The Italians were 
accustomed to the deductive method of analysis, while the case method 
approach supposed an inductive approach. These factors limited the possibility 
of integration between the productivity policies (which were being introduced 
in Italy during that period) and the development of a larger concept of training 
in business administration. Copeland said that, 
"The imparting of information on new production techniques may well 
have some immediate value, but for the long pull a widespread and 
thorough administrative understanding not only of those technique and 
their implications but also of various other aspects of business 
management will be found to be indispensable for a sustained increase of 
productivity''." 
In order to develop a larger strategy it was necessary not only to by-pass the 
obstacles mentioned above, but also to develop the cultural patterns which could 
fertilize the management sciences. It was precisely in the same period during 
which IPSOA's experiment took place that the European Productivity Agency, 
started a study on these problems. Alexander King observed that the possibility 
of developing such a science as an integrated and interdisciplinary field was 
strictly connected to the level of growth and to the process of 
institutionalization of the social sciences (industrial psychology, industrial 
sociology, organizational theory, theory of the firms). In Italy, more than in any 
other European country, questions related not so much to how new techniques 
or new disciplines should be introduced, as they did to the lack of a suitable 
institutional and intellectual context, and secondly - as stressed by Herbert 
Simon - the by-passing of a crucial gap between the social system that produces 
scientific knowledge and the social system, where professional practice takes 
place. 
Paradoxically, the most positive effect of IPSOA's educational experiment 
could not be found at the level of entrepreneurial strategies (at that period 
management philosophy was not clearly grasped even by those who voiced their 
approval of this), but at the level of the social and intellectual diaspora that 
IPSOA generated. The underlying ideas and methods of IPSOA continued to 
"' ivi P. 19  
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flourish under two other management centers which started in the fifties, CUOA 
(Centro Universitario per l'Organizzazione Aziendale), founded in Padua in 
1957, and ISIDA founded in Palermo in 1956. On the other hand, the biological 
È  life of IPSOA (that definitively closed its doors in 1964) continued through the 
large amount of organizational know-how that the institute offered to further 
European experiments in building business schools, first at all to the INSEAD's 
builders. As far as concerns IPSOA's diaspora, it should be added that many of 
its former assistants continued to spread its message in other Italian institutions, 
such as FORMEZ. A positive and creative result of this diaspora was also the 
creation of some important consulting companies. This was particularly the case 
of a former Olivetti man and IPSOa's assistant, Pietro  Gennaro, who became 
the leader of an important group of consulting experts in Milan. Later, at the end 
of the sixties, Gennaro  was among the founders of a successful Italian business 
school, ISTUD at Stresa.  In other cases, former IPSOA assistants acted as 
catalyzers and promoters of the managerial culture within the traditional system, 
mostly as free-lance professors (Flavia Derossi, Bontadini, Malinvemi); less 
frequently they became full professors in the Italian faculties of  "Economia e 
Commercio"  (Sergio Ricossa, Giovanni Micheletti)''. 
What then really happened to IPSOA? In 1957, according to the numerous 
memoranda in the Ford foundation's files, the institute had already hit a crisis. 
A Ford officer, Waldemar Nielsen observed that, 
"The causes seem to be the usual Italian ones of sharp personality clashes 
and erratic management". 
In some notes, taken during a trip in Europe in 1957, another Ford foundation 
officer, Stanley Gordon, observed that Adriano Olivetti's attitude towards 
IPSOA was now less optimistic than in the past. FIAT'S willingness to continue 
with a financial support to the institute had become weaker and weaker. 
"According to Olivetti /../ FIAT is apparently trying to merge the Turin 
school with the Turin Polytechnic Institute. The latter school is stuffy and 
traditional /../ and a merger would be the "coup de grace" for the Turin 
school. Olivetti thinks that the new NestI6 school in Lausanne is 
apparently recruiting staff from the Faculty at Turin." 
Unfortunately, the Turin institute's crisis began exactly when the 
European machine was gaining momentum and when US-European policies of 
technological and scientific cooperation entered in their organizational phase. As 
2'  Until now we do not have a systematic analysis of IPSOA's intellectual and 
organizational networks. For a first attempt in this direction see  G. Faliva and F. 
Pennarola, Storia della consulenza di  direzione in Italia. Protagonisti, idee, tenden_e 
evolutive, Milano, Edizioni Olivares 1992. 
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we will see in the next paragraph, in America, this phase was characterized by 
attempts to activate cross-fertilization strategies rather than by produce a 
mechanical transplant of methods and educational patterns, as occurred in the 
case of IPSOA. Moreover, the "Europe-effect" reinforced the impetus for the 
creation of new business school with a trans-national structure and a multilingual 
culture. This was particularly the case of INSEAD in Fontainebleau and of 
IMEDE in Lausanne. This was also the main goal of the first networks of 
European business schools, such as the Fondation Industrie-Universit6, created 
by Gaston Deurink in Brussels, the European Association of Management 
Training Centers (EAMTC) and the International University Contact (IUC) 
which began to organism European research and graduated studies programs in 
cooperation with the most important American business schools. The most 
significant effect of this organizational dynamism was that, between the end of 
the fifties and the beginning of the sixties, the most traditional institutions such 
as the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales en France, also started a plan to 
modernize their curricula according to American models. At HEC, a small group 
of former students of CPA, headed by Guy Lherault tried to transform a 
traditional "grande 6cole" into a dynamic new school, which would be well-
connected with the American and European institutions". The effect of an 
almost invisible process of cross-fertilization which lasted for almost thirty 
years, the origins of which date back to the CPA experiment in the thirties, 
began to bear results. The Ford foundation plan for European management 
education acted as a crucial catalyst for this dynamic context which 
unfortunately did not include IPSOA. Adriano Olivetti died prematurely in 1962 
and IPSOA ceased its activities two years later in 1964, which coincided 
precisely with the appointment of Marshall Robinson (a former vice-dean of the 
Pittsburgh School of Management) to the direction of EDA's program (European 
Development and Administration); the Ford foundation had started its grander 
design for management education. This was also, as we will see, the period in 
which the small institute, tucked away in the woods of Fontainebleau, 
transformed itself in one of the most prestigious European business schools. 
Because some crucial aspects of INSEAD's development (as well as, of course, 
of other institutions which are not considered in this article) are related to Ford 
foundation's cross-fertilization policies, it is important to spend some time in 
analyzing their general structure and goals. 
222 M. Nouschi, Histoire et pouroir d'une Grunde Ecole HEC , Paris, Robert 
Lqf  font, 1988, pp. 89--95 
The Ford foundation's plan for European management education - A 
general survey. 
The foundation's first step was to finance (within the International Affairs 
Program) an EPA program called "Pool of American Professors in Business 
Administration". 
The draft of the project presented in 1957 to the Ford foundation by Roger 
Gregoire is clearly directed at the improvement of management education by 
creating a good, permanent and research trained teaching staff. As mentioned 
above, IPSOA's development entirely depended on a non-permanent Faculty 
which was also a reason for weakness amongst most of the European Business 
Schools. Gregoire wrote that, 
"The present project aims at overcoming part of the shortage of teachers 
of Business Administration in Europe. The EPA and other programs in 
this field have, in fact, resulted in the creation of numerous schools of 
business management, for which qualified professors are urgently needed. 
The EPA with considerable financial support from the United States 
International Cooperation Administration, is endeavoring to increase both 
the numbers and the quality of management teachers by means of its 
reaches training projects in the USA and in Europe; however, it must be 
recognized that demand has outstripped the availability, primarily because 
of the length of time required to train qualified personnel and steps must 
be taken if European management teaching is to develop as rapidly as 
desired'-'." 
The Ford foundation's reply was rapid and positive. It was clear that the 
need for this kind of investment had taken a firm hold in Europe in the late 
fifties and was certainly strengthened by the European integration after the treaty 
of Rome. The economic expansion, which took place as a result of the European 
recovery, had a direct impact on private firms and, in particular, on small and 
medium-size enterprises. One result of the growth in the size of the firms was 
the demand for a greater variety of specialized skills at middle management 
level. Universities and other training institutions in Europe were not geared to 
providing individuals with these new fields of specialization. Gregoire observed 
that, 
"In addition, the fear of economic distortions, presumably to be caused by 
the integration of European economies, caused grave concerns to small 
and medium entrepreneurs, who were in fact the body of public opinion 
2' FFA Reel 0527, Grant No 57265, section I 
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which most resisted the various plan of economic integration. In this way 
EPA not only helped to overcome the resistance but helped in creating an 
atmosphere in which change was welcomed as an opportunity rather than 
feared as a difficulty." 
The program proposed by EPA consisted of a two phase plan: a short-teen plan 
essentially based on a series of Executive Development seminars, open to both 
executives holding posts of responsibility in medium-size enterprises and to the 
young graduates of the traditional schools of economics; and a long-term 
program, aimed at creating in Europe permanent institutions. The main goal of 
the second phase was not only to supply the managers needs by the expanding 
and integrated economies of the European member countries but also to create 
research and study centers in management. It was this long-term program which 
captured the Ford foundation's attention. 
The first step towards this goal was taken by providing the schools with 
American professors. In fact, 25 of them arrived from different American 
institutions and different areas of the US, but with a large percentage from 
Michigan. This was an important factor for the introduction of subjects such as 
marketing and organizational behavior to the new European school's 
curriculum, considering that these disciplines were already considerably 
advanced both at Ann Arbor and the Chicago School of Business 
Administration. 
American professors had two main tasks: conducting courses as well as 
giving policy advice to the new institutions to set them off in the "right 
direction". This direction was of course related to the implementation of 
American standards which should create also a basic similarity among 
institutions disseminated in different countries. An important part of their work 
was also selecting young assistant professors who would receive a scholarship 
from different sponsors, including the Fulbright program (which was already 
well developed in many European countries, dating back to the early fifties) to 
spend a one-year period in the United States during which they could specialize 
in a particular subject in the area of business administration. Then in 1957, the 
foundation approved a grant of $98,400 which was renewed at the same rate in 
1959. The background discussion of the aims of this scholarship provides an 
illuminating account of the federation's general policy in this field: 
"The development of business management training in European 
universities is considered to be important in terms of the objectives of the 
foundation's European program and in the program in Economic 
Development and Administration. Such training can contribute directly 
to strengthening the European economy and also have a direct effect on 
the structure, methods and orientation of European higher education. The 
encouragement of such professional schools in Europe, like the  
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development of the social sciences generally, will help repair the broken 
link between European academic institutions and the pressing social, 
economic and political problems of the continent. Business management 
training has had rapid growth in post-war Europe and the problem at the 
moment is not only to encourage further growth but to keep it on a sound 
basis of competence and qualitÿ4." 
The foundation's main goal was clearly to transpose to a European context the 
basic patterns of American 'organizational synthesis" rather than to simply 
export educational contents and teaching programs. Obviously, however, the 
possibility to develop this strategy largely depended on "contexts": in the 
countries where management (and not only management education) was still a 
no man's land, this transfer was mainly centered on contents and programs. 
Considering the problem of "contrast of contexts" within a rather homogenous 
strategy of dissemination, like that of the Ford foundation during the late fifties 
and the early sixties, it is interesting to note that the demand of American guest 
professors came mostly from those countries in which management education 
had met serious obstacles in its process of institutionalization, that is from Italy 
(61%) and from England (17,5%). Other requests came from Netherlands 
(15,5%), Sweden (5,%%) and Belgium (0,5%). In Italy, especially at ISIDA in 
Palermo there was with no doubt the highest concentration of American 
professors. 
It is evident that in its first three years of life (1957-1959), ISIDA could 
profit from IPSOA's crisis, obtaining the best American professors available 
(Ezra Solomon from Stanford and Mervin Waterman from Ann Arbor School 
of Business Administration taught Finance and Controls; Joseph W. Towle from 
Washington University and Pearson Hunt from Harvard University taught 
General Management; Paul Converse from the University of Illinois and Edward 
Cundiff from the University of Texas taught Marketing, Norman Maier from 
Ann Arbor thought Industrial Relations and Psychological Research). The 
reports of American professors reveal that ISIDA's experiment and Morello's 
interest at the Institute in research and the organisation of a general management 
curriculum (contrasting strongly with the Italian trade schools' curricula) was 
considered a very positive outcome by the American observers. During this 
period ISIDA Was thought to be a very promising institution in the European 
context, as was IPSOA at the beginning of the '50s. Thus, we can say that at the 
end of the '50s, Italy was at the core of the American experiment of "exporting" 
'-; European Productivity Agency Business Management Training (1957), 
Discussion p.2 FFA Reel 0527, Grant No 57265 
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management education to the "Old Continent". The backwardness of Italy in this 
field was probably an element which facilitated this rather mechanical transfer. 
The situation changed rapidly on both sides of the Atlantic in the first half 
of the '60s when the dissemination of management education in Europe led to 
the heightening of asymmetry among institutions and national cultural strategies. 
Unfortunately, Italy was characterized by a rapid process of involution which 
characterized the "static" sixties. Gabriele Morello wrote that, 
"Under the bonanza of the much praised "economic miracles" the need for 
investments in human resources was not felt /../. The number of 
executives who in the sixties went through regular learning exercises can 
be counted in terms of a few hundred per year /../. One could ask why the 
new initiatives did not originate from the universities /../. Historically, 
Italy was probably the first country to conceive the engineer as a man of 
vast and complex knowledge /../. But the technician of general education, 
this Leonardian type of all-round figures, did not last long, soon be 
replaced, under the spurs of technological process by specialists. And thus 
it happened that /../ Italian faculties were divided into small bit and pieces 
of specialized sciences /../ and the Italian educational model was frozen 
into a monolithic system which kept adding new depaitntents and 
disciplines while leaving unchanged the structure of the system /../. Since 
each small piece of science turned into a chair, meant status and personal 
gratification for somebody, the impetus for the for the citadels of 
knowledge to become citadels of power, was real and concrete"." 
One element should be added to his lucid analysis. Whilst in a post-
graduate studies' strategy and structure were rapidly developed in most of the 
disciplines in the majority of European countries, in Italy, despite the energy 
devoted to this aim by a small group of enlightened intellectuals and 
administrators (strongly supported by the Ford foundation) nothing happened. 
A post-graduate studies' structure was created only at the beginning of the 80's, 
as an extreme "rattrappage" in order to avoid complete exclusion from the 
European educational standards. This statement helps to explain two sequences 
of events: firstly, why Italy participated so intensively in the first phase of the 
Ford foundation's international policies, but played an almost insignificant role 
in the second phase which was devoted to strengthening research and graduate-
studies program rather than to simply export "American patterns" of training and 
education. Secondly, this is why the shift between the end of the fifties and the 
25 G.Morello, Changing Organizations and the Role of Management Development, 
EFMD, IIIrd Annual Conference Proceedings, Turin 19--22 May 1974, pp. 60--62 
23 
mid-sixties was so strong and evident especially in the relationships on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The development of new attitudes in American "cultural 
behavior" which basically moved towards a cross-fertilization policy, considering 
differences as well as similarities of countries and cultures, undoubtedly 
facilitated the already existing process of differentiation in size and strategies, 
which was so typical of the development of the European business schools 
during the sixties. In fact, the most visible "contrast of contexts" during this 
period depended on the asymmetry between the dynamic situation which 
characterized some European countries like France, Belgium and to some 
England (considering its basic resistance to management education's 
development and the Italian involution. I shall return to this point. What should 
be stressed is that, despite the many shifts produced by the historical period, the 
basis for the new trend which characterized Ford foundation's policies in 
European educational programs during the sixties, should be retraced to the 
previous experimental phase, described above, whose goals and strategy were 
largely inspired by the idea of simply exporting some dominant cultural patterns. 
The reports of each professor, involved in the EPA's program on the 
situation of the schools they visited, were precious instruments for the Ford 
foundation both in relation to the definition of its policy of investments in each 
country, with respect to the level of acceptance of management education at 
university, and the selection of projects to be given priority in the Foundation's 
general policy. 
At the end of the fifties, when the EPA had ceased its activities and the 
Ford foundation had entered into the European arena alone, its agenda had 
changed. In the mid-sixties the problem was not so much how to educate 
European managers rather how to reduce organizational asymmetry between 
Europe and the United States and how to by-pass the technological gap between 
the two continents. On both sides of the Atlantic, outstanding observers like 
Robert McNamara and Jean Jacques Servan Schreiber pointed to a strict 
correlation between the technological and the managerial gap, precisely at the 
time when the state of management education in Europe was attracting 
increasing attention even in countries like the United Kingdom, where the 
problem had been underestimated for a very long period. The Ford foundation 
had its own vision on this subject: it considered that the managerial gap could 
be filled only by stimulating research and integrating it as a factor of 
development both at the level of the industrial and educational strategies. 
The formal launching of the Ford foundation's program occurred in 1967 
(which coincided with the publication of Servan Schreiber's book, The 
American Challenge). At that time, the foundation had already acquired fifteen 
years experience, thanks to the EPA program as we have seen, but also thanks 
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to a series of small grants, frequently devoted to improving teachers training 
through international programs, such as the International Teachers Program. 
An overall view of the European Management Education program reveals 
that it involved 47 major grant actions and 81 doctoral fellowship grants. 
Excluding individual fellowships, grant sizes ranged from $1,000,000 to $3,000. 
The average duration of grant action with a programmatic character was two 
years. The European program was organized under different main approaches 
corresponding to different needs and organizational strategies. Then it was not 
a one-way program. On the contrary it implied experimental and articulated 
side-streets. 
Many grants were devoted to "institutional development", ie. to 
strengthening institutions which were mostly, but not exclusively, non-university 
training centers. This occurred in two ways: by creating professional deanships 
and strengthening the creation of a permanent Faculty, as was the case for 
INSEAD ($1,000,000 on a partial matching basis) and for CEI (Centre d'Etudes  
Industriels in Geneva $250,000); and secondly, by improving research staff and 
training in support of doctoral programs, as was the case for the London 
Graduate School of Business Studies and the Manchester Business School in the 
United Kingdom and for CEROG (Centre de Recherche en Sciences de 
FOrganisation) in France ($300,000). CEROG was conceived as an 
implementation, qt the post-graduate level, of the activities of the already 
existing IAE-Instituts d'Administration des Entreprises (created in 1955 by 
Pierre Tabatoni, as Institutes of the Faculties of Law, with the enthusiastic 
agreement of Gaston Berger, the dynamic Directeur de FEnseignement 
Supérieur).  
Other grants were devoted to "visits and exchanges" from both sides of the 
Atlantic, which shared the goal of strengthening European institutions. This was 
the case of the grant to the Stockholm School of Economics whose aim was to 
bring specialists from different countries to Stockhohn in order to enrich the 
school curriculum and research standards. 
A third type of support was related to "networks building". This is a very 
rich and interesting chapter of the Ford foundation adventure in Europe and 
deserves more attention than I can give it in this paper. Each institution 
supported by this kind of grant (particularly the European Association of 
Management Training Centers and the International University Contact, which 
later merged with the European Foundation for Management Development, la 
Fondation Industrie-Université and the European Institute for Advanced Studies 
in Management, all located in Brussels) has, in fact, its own very articulated 
history which is worth recalling in some detail. 
Most of the grants were devoted to "starting and strengthening research 
centers". In the United Kingdom, the University of Warwick was given a  
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$250,000 grant for the establishment of a Centre for Industrial and Business 
Studies within the School of Social Sciences. Anther grant of $ 100,000 went 
to the International Institute for Management of Technology, sponsored by 
J OECD, established in Milan in 1971. This latter venture was a total failure, but 
the brief history of this institution is very interesting, because it was planned as 
being a kind of European M.I.T. on the basis of the INSEAD model, which was 
considered, at least initially, to be the European equivalent of the Harvard 
Business School. 
The largest amount of financing ($1,000,000) was devoted to the doctoral 
fellowships which allowed young European teachers to go to the U. S. graduate 
schools to do their doctoral studies at one of the 12 participating U.S. graduate 
schools of management. At the end of this period the participants were required 
to return to Europe to an academic career. As could be expected not all fellows 
returned to Europe. Many of them preferred to find jobs in American 
multinational companies or teach in American schools. This was one of the 
reasons why the Ford foundation decided to simultaneously develop some 
European networks ( with $1,500,000), according to a more general trend which 
characterized US-European relationships during the mid-sixties which was 
inspired by the philosophy of the "equal partnership". The creation of EIASM 
was a kind of compromise resulting from a very complicated experimental 
phase during which many options were confronted. All these options were 
discussed in 1968 in a key meeting at Rotterdam. The Foundation's officers and 
many American consultants recommended the creation of an excellent doctoral 
granting international institution to be located in Western Europe. The European 
experts and educators resisted that idea and EIASM was created from this 
original disagreement. "It was designed as an institution for graduate studies 
operated by US-European faculty, to supplement training at the student's home 
institution, not to compete with it26." As a matter of fact, at the end of the 
sixties the map of European business schools was not only highly differentiated, 
but had already developed its own lines of cooperation and competition, which 
were related both to the different institutional scale and to the articulated scopes 
of each institution. Moreover, the map of participants to EIASM doctoral 
programs, both per country and per institution, is a very interesting area in 
which to analyze the dynamics of cooperation and competition among the 
different business schools. As an example of such dynamics, one can recall that 
while the London Business School valued the Institute very little, its most direct 
rival, the Manchester school, was one of its stronger supporters! 
2 
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Generally speaking, it could be said that some of the Ford foundation 
grants constituted the basis for rapid and progressively autonomous growth of 
European management which really became in this period an "apprenti sorcier".  
This was particularly the case of some institutions which acted as "poles of 
excellence" in the development of European management and management 
educational strategies. A crucial case study in this context is that of INSEAD 
which succeeded in capitalising two sets of opportunities: those which were 
created by the dynamic French environment, both in political and economical 
context (so clearly opposed to the Italian situation during the same period) and 
those created by US cooperation strategies between the end of the sixties and 
the first half of the seventies. 
Competitive cooperation: INSEAD's challenges 
From this point of view, the study of INSEAD's process of institutionalization 
offers a good case study to develop the "contrast of contexts" approach in the 
long period. INSEAD's history constitutes, in fact, an important chapter of the 
Ford foundation's European program for management education ever since its 
experimental phase. At a later stage, INSEAD's development can be compared 
with IPSOA's history. 
In the following phase, when the Ford foundation's program involved a 
large number of European business schools and their networks, INSEAD, which 
was considered the most "American" among the European business schools, 
obtained the largest support and was considered as a pole of excellence 
("l'Harvard Européenne"). Rather paradoxically, it was also one of the few 
European schools which succeeded in producing an articulate strategy of 
competitive-cooperation not only vis-à-vis the other European schools but also 
towards the most important American institutions (including HBS) , while 
transforming itself in a more and more international educational structure''. 
As mentioned above, INSEAD was projected and created in 1957, which was 
also the period of largest expansion of IPSOA, thanks to the initiative of the 
General Doriot and of a group of enlightened industrialists related to the CPA. 
as early as the mid-fifties, CPA embarked upon a process of internationalization 
of its activities and worked in close cooperation with IPSOA towards this 
'-' For a detailed account of this structural change see G. Gemelli Per uria storia 
comparata delle business schools in Europa. Le origini dell'INSEAD ,cit.The List part 
of this article is largely based on this previous studv on INSEAD . 
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goa128. In many cases, the INSEAD architects could profit from the know-how 
of their Italian colleagues. When the Fontainebleau institute opened its doors in 
1958 some of the former IPSOA students attended classes at INSEAD. It should 
be noted that, among the restricted group of professors at the new institute, there 
was a bright young Italian professor of marketing, Salvatore Teresi. Whilst he 
was not a product of IPSOA, he had good relations with the Turin school's 
network and, importantly, played an important role in activating the involvement 
of the "Comitato Nazionale per la Produttivitii" in supporting and organizing 
management education in Italy. 
When INSEAD started its classes the French industrial and institutional 
environment was as inhospitable as the Italian one. The university system and 
in particular the "grandes écoles" had a monopoly over higher education even 
in commercial studies. Since 1881, in fact, there has been the Ecole de Hautes  
Etudes Commerciales in France, which has developed strong ties within the 
social milieu of the entrepreneurial elite. Until the Second World War, and even 
afterwards, the French entrepreneurial environment was dominated by small and 
medium enterprises which had little interest in MBA programs. Nevertheless, 
unlike their Italian colleagues, INSEAD's pioneers were able to take advantage 
of some opportunities to the extent of being able to transform what appeared as 
an obstacle into additional impetus. 
An important opportunity was created by the process of cross-fertilization 
achieved through the CPA whose methods and training patterns were assimilated 
by a large number of students the most varied institutional backgrounds, and 
who later, had different careers not only in the industry but also in bureaucracy, 
finance, and diplomacy. An excellent example of this process of "horizontal 
fertilization" of different social and institutional segments is Pierre Uri, a former 
CPA student who became head of the Commissariat au plan. 
As we have seen, in order to resist to university system's opposition, 
IPSOA progressively transformed itself a kind of "innovation enclosure" with 
lower and lower relationships with the entrepreneurial and the academic 
environment. On the contrary INSEAD's founders, developing general Doriot's 
strategic orientation, tried to consolidate a large network of supporters and 
donors not only in France but also in Europe and in the United States. Instead 
of exasperating opposition to the University system, INSEAD tried to by-pass 
it and to find a financial basis of its existence directly from the entrepreneurial 
'-R Also the Ford Foundation's officers underlined the strict relations between the 
two institutions "Professor Gregoire believes that the projected international business 
school inspired by professor Doriot of the Harvard Business School will be a new 
IPSOA", Visit to M.  Roger Gregoire, Director, European Productivity Agency. Inter 
Office Memorandum november 7, 1957 FFA, Reel 0527, Grant No 57265 
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environment. This element marks also a crucial distance vis-à-vis the American 
Business Schools' organizational patterns, which in most of cases, depended on 
attachment to a large university. Within a very brief period of time, another 
important opportunity was created by a rapidly changing political situation, 
characterized at the international level by the process of implementation of 
European unification which implied the strengthening of an intellectual (and 
virtually political) identity at its roots. At the national level INSEAD could 
profit of the effects of Mendés-France policy whose main orientation was to 
create a solid and dynamic interface between the public sector and the prevail 
sector, between the bureaucratic system and the entrepreneurial milieu. 
Unfortunately this orientation, despite the effort of an enlighten group of 
reformers, was totally lacking in Italy. 
Finally, INSEAD could take advantage of the opportunity created by the 
intellectual and the social capital of the founders who were former American 
trained scholars, with a good knowledge of the American educational patterns 
(including the case method) and who, as former student of Maurice Allais at 
the Ecole Polytechnique, also had excellent training in operational mathematics. 
All these basic factors undoubtedly facilitated relationships with the most 
important American business schools (Harvard, Stanford and Chicago) and also 
the placement of young graduates in American firms and multinationals, 
precisely at the time when European expansion was at its peak. Hence, it is not 
surprising that when the Ford foundation decided to support European 
management education INSEAD was considered as a strategic investment. 
Pressure for this came not only from General Doriot who was a member of the 
Ford foundation trustees, but also the Harvard Business School which, during 
the sixties, became increasingly interested in developing European case studies 
as teaching material. Actually, in the first phase of institutional development, 
INSEAD participated intensively to the programs organized by Harvard, 
especially the "teachers program", the aim of which was to "produce" the future 
European professor of management. Insofar as concerns the case studies 
material, the Institute developed its own strategy very rapidly, which was mostly 
aimed at satisfying the demands of the European (and later also international) 
entrepreneurial environment. From the mid-seventies, the Institute developed 
also at an organizational level, an increasingly autonomous strategy to such an 
extent that it launched the European Teacher Program to challenge Harvard's 
monopoly. Moreover, at the beginning of the seventies the Institute strongly 
resisted the idea of creating a European Harvard in Switzerland. In sum, 
competitive elements began to grow out the initial cooperation. 
Paradoxically, one of the effects of the Ford foundation's conspicuous 
financial support was the growth of new institutional areas whose further 
developments generated somewhat conflicting interests among the Institute's  
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different sectors'v. The Foundation's grant paved the way for the stabilization 
of INSEAD's faculty by creating the position of a professional dean. As a 
consequence of its financial constraints (which were based on a system of  
i  matching, which required that for every $1 of American financing, the Institute 
had to find an autonomous financing to the sum of $1,50 - see table) it 
stimulated the need to develop larger and permanent contacts with the 
entrepreneurial environment, and in particular to give the necessary impulsion 
to organism a structure of fund-raising which would be progressively integrated 
with research and development strategies. This new impulsion led to the creation 
of CEDEP, a structure of ongoing education which is conceived as a "Club" of 
associated companies (see table). Each enterprise participating in CEDEP's 
programs had to subscribe to its programs for almost five years, whilst 
developing a progressive re-integration of the managers who followed these 
programs inside the different sectors of the firm. Moreover, the new CEDEP 
subscribers, in order to become partners, should have the agreement of the other 
members. 
Indeed, CEDEP was only an element of the process of institutional 
differentiation of the Fontainebleau's institute which progressively implied a 
change of its size. The stabilization of INSEAD's Faculty allowed a more 
differentiated and articulated offer of the Institute's programs. MBA programs 
(whose duration is shorter than in the American schools) were complemented 
not only by ongoing education programs but also by rapidly expanding 
"executive program" which was crucial to developing a productive relationship 
with the entrepreneurial environment. 
As we have seen, this process of differentiation and in particular the 
stabilization of the faculty remained a virtual possibility in IPSOA's 
development. The most negative consequence of this lack of opportunities was 
the fact that the Turin school depended entirely upon American teaching 
materials and was not able to produce case studies which could be really and 
practically useful to the Italian firms. The "enclosure effect" of IPSOA can be 
demonstrated by the lack of demand for IPSOA's products by Italian firms. On 
the contrary, the range of INSEAD products rapidly began to increase its 
diffusion at the beginning of the seventies. However, it is true to say that the 
institutional and historical situation has changed rapidly after the mid-sixties 
when precisely IPSOA closed its doors. 
Another element of which reveals the impetus of INSEAD's development 
was the resistance that the Institute posed to American donors when they applied 
pressure on it to accelerate its process of academicization. The idea of forging 
29G.Gemelli, Per una storia comparata delle Business Schools in Europa. Le origini 
dell'INSEAD, cit.,pp.380 and 395-98.  
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an equal partnership with Europe supported by the Ford foundation implied in 
fact that the most important European institutions could adapt themselves very 
rapidly to American standards. During the seventies the "mot d'ordre" was 
profess ionalization of management through academic research. INSEAD 
accepted this challenge but with its own timing, that is within the limits fixed 
by its own institutional development which needed a strenuous effort to improve 
relationships between the French and European entrepreneurial environment. In 
the long run these links became not only a good opportunity but also a challenge 
to the contrary. 
One should consider, however, that INSEAD's crucial shift from a 
training institute to an educational structure occurred in the mid-seventies (see 
table) when not only the international, economic and financial context changed 
in a dramatic way, but also the system of Euro-American relationships reached 
a crucial turning point. Paradoxically, 1973 marked the beginning of a critical 
period, which was further endorsed by Henri Kissinger. On this subject, a key 
actor (the American ambassador at the European Communities, Robert 
Schaetzel) affirmed that,  
"Dans la periode antérieure, l'accent dans les rélations américano-
européennes était sur la co-opération, la tension était présente mais 
manifestement au second plan. En 1970, cet accent était renversé 
désormaisj0." 
As a matter of fact, many elements, such as changing priorities in American 
foreign policy, loss of legitimacy of a US global hegemony as a consequence 
of the Vietnam war- coupled with international economic and financial crisis 
converged to create a particular troublesome period in the Euro-American 
relationships. Then it is not surprising that in the mid-seventies also the Ford 
foundation program in developing European management education was on the 
retreat. 
This retreat was well suited to the general orientation of the foundation's 
policy during the seventies, with the new presidency of McGeorge Bundy. A 
former Ford foundation officer, Waldemar A. Nielsen, who participated in many 
European ventures, wrote in his book entitled, "The big foundations", 
"The foundation's international programs, which some had thought might 
be Bundy's primary interest, were simultaneously given a lower priority  
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than the domestic programs. The European segments, under a rapid 
succession of chiefs, almost disintegrated"." 
Nielsen's statement needs to be modified in one respect. Bundy created, in fact, 
1 a new and well-supported program, Higher Education and Research, which 
provided the basis for the most important results to be achieved in management 
education cross-fertilization strategies (both in Western and in Eastern Europe). 
It should be added, however, that the Higher Education and Research division 
does not have a comprehensive concern for Europe as a geographic and political 
entry, as was the case of the International Affairs Program. Just prior to the mid-
seventies, the era of the Ford foundation's European adventure as a strategic 
target was coming to an end. During the period of McGeorge Bundy's 
presidency, Europe was not yet the core but rather a part of the Ford 
foundation's international design. Moreover since the mid-seventies 
management education became an international rather than an Europe-American 
value. 
INSEAD was indeed one of the few (and probably the first) European 
business schools to meet this challenge with an increasing internationalization 
of its faculty, students, programs and research centers (such as the creation of 
the Euro-Asia centre in 1975). 
From the late seventies onwards and especially during the eighties, the 
business schools extensively changed their international dynamics within their 
world-wide campuses and also their cultural frameworks and pattern of 
communication. American patterns ceased to be the unique reference and 
competitive competition became progressively a shared pattern or even a 
necessary strategy within the war of educational standards which implies a 
crucial challenge: competition between educational systems is in fact coupled 
with the desire to internationalize education, that is to say "for concepts and 
international norms which /../ allow for some compatibility between the 
different systems"". From the end of the seventies, INSEAD made strong 
efforts to anticipate and then to meet this challenge in an individual way, which 
was and still is by developing in each of its institutional areas and for each of 
its set of products, a "trans-national focus". Should one group together in the 
"war of degrees", the German model, the American model and the Latin model, 
and also the INSEAD's model? What are the alternative models to activate a 
31 Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Big Foundations, New York, Columbia Unh,. Press, 
1973, 106 
"'Quoted by P. Melandri, Une incertaine alliance. Les Etats-Unis et l'Europe 1973-
1983, Paris, publications de la Sorbonne, 1988, p. 53 
32j.  P. Nioche, The War of Degrees in European Management Education in "EFMD 
Forum", 1992, it.], p. 21 
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coordinated European educational strategy? These questions clearly go beyond 
the content of this article, but are certainly implied in its conclusions. 
Conclusions 
Problems of transfer and cultural translation as well as problems of contrasts of 
contexts are in fact now, perhaps more than in the past, at the core of the debate 
on management education. 
INSEAD's case study, as compared, by contrast, with the almost 
contemporary experiment of IPSOA, offers an interesting historical background 
to analyze how a positive and innovative imitation of dominant patterns implies 
firstly a flexible institutional strategy and a creative mental picture. hi 
INSEAD's development, American influence had principally the effect of 
stimulating this flexibility and this mental map. INSEAD's institutional choice 
was that of a "selective imitation", that is to say of a translation of American 
patterns into its own institutional culture whose first imperative was to develop 
at each level and stage of its structure an intimate contact and an extensive 
communication with its national, European and, later on, international 
environment. From this point of view, one could maintain that the Fontainebleau 
Institute founded and developed its processual equilibrium between the social 
system (which produces scientific knowledge) and the social and information 
system (in which professional practice takes place) on unstable ground. 
IPSOA's organizers perceived flexibility as a problem and even as a danger 
when they were faced to the academic power and University supremacy. Then 
they chose to isolate themselves in their perfect "citadels". On the contrary, 
INSEAD founders, by transforming the impulsion created by the "effect Europe" 
after the treaty of Rome into a cultural strategy, considering flexibility as a 
challenge. Moreover, given the historically favorable climate for change, 
produced by the petroleum crisis and by the growth of European multinationals 
in the mid-seventies, they succeeded in transforming the "necessity" to be 
flexible into an opportunity to compete on the world-wide campus of 
management education. Indeed, what seems to differentiate INSEAD's 
development from the evolution of American schools in the last decades is more 
the capacity of the Fontainebleau's institute of "internalizing" a complex 
environment, which is related to different social systems, rather than its growth 
as an academic institution with its own program of Ph.D. studies which, 
actually, is only a recent acquisition of the Institute. The growth of INSEAD's 
academic excellence seems to be the product rather than the cause of its 
institutional growth which has firstly implied a strategic commitment in 
simultaneously strengthening, through a shared trans-national focus, its different 
sectors (MBA, executive programs, continuing education, academic research,  
fund raising) . The most significant effect of this strategic orientation is the 
consolidation of an institutional dynamic which could be described through 
Alfred Chandler's theoretical terms: INSEAD developed its structure following 
the variations of a strategic design whose steps and stages were related to the 
Institute's progressive changes of "size". The non calculated effect of this 
rational choice was the growth of a synergetic interface between INSEAD's two 
aims, that of an academic institution and that of an enterprise capable to 
stimulate and even create its own markets. 
In conclusion could one say that the problematic of influence and cultural 
hegemony is a too narrow path when the problem is not to analyze the linear 
dynamics of imitation but the complex phenomena of translation which implies, 
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